TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/121189/12118900.040

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 9.4 KB | 205 lines

                                                                                INTERVIEW, Page 46

He Stopped The Shooting


EGON KRENZ overruled his bosses to prevent bloodshed during
demonstrations in East Germany. But despite a West German
proposal to develop closer ties, he sees no chance for

By James O. Jackson and Frederick Ungeheuer and Egon Krenz


    Q. After 28 years, the Berlin Wall is open. What motivated
you to make this move after all these years?

    A. My starting point is that freedom of movement is a basic
human right. Thus there could be no better proof of our
sincerity about renewing socialism than by starting with human
rights. I considered it a disadvantage that we were signers of
the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna declaration yet we did not
abide by certain parts of those agreements. We intend by this
action to emphasize the unity between word and deed. Last but
not least, let me stress that to open the border does not mean
that its existence should be questioned.

    Q. Do you mean to say there are other classes that should
now be included in the formation of political consensus?

    A. I am in favor of a solution of all the problems of this
society by reaching consensus by all the existing social and
political forces in the country. There is always more than one
solution for a given problem. The most important element of
consensus is that it serves the majority of the people. Nothing
should happen that would serve only a part of this society and
not the majority.

    Q. Several very senior members of the party and the
government have been expelled recently from the Politburo, the
Central Committee and the party. What were the most serious
infractions they committed against the state and the people?

    A. First and foremost, their actions and their behavior led
to the loss of the confidence that the people had put in them.
There was a gap between words and deeds.

    With regard to Gunter Mittag, who was in charge of the
economy, he did misuse his office and was expelled from the
party for it. I hesitate to say more at this point in time
because it would be wrong for me to interfere in a case that is
the subject of judicial proceedings.

    Q. In your long career, you have been responsible for youth
affairs and, as a member of the Politburo, for state security.
Why did you not insist on reforms much earlier?

    A. There are many steps along a career path, and every
honest politician goes up a learning curve. In the beginning,
I felt that Erich Honecker was a person worth emulating because
of the way he combined economic achievement with social progress
and the great attention he paid to youth affairs.

    Later I felt very strongly about decisions that had very
little to do with reality. I expressed this view on repeated
occasions in the mid-'80s, when great changes were taking place
in socialist societies, primarily in the Soviet Union. In the
leadership there was a majority, influenced by Honecker, Mittag
and others, that opposed these international changes. You can
imagine that as a man less than 50 at that time, faced with a
General Secretary over 70, my views were not always accepted.

    Q. He considered you a mere youngster . . .?

    A. Yes, you could say that. But furthermore, to change
policies you need a political majority. My political friends
will confirm that I felt very much inspired by the ideas of
Gorbachev, without thinking that the same changes had to be
introduced here. We were and still are different countries. The
essential thing is socialism with a human face combined with
democracy. I am convinced that if we had opted for this course
earlier, we would not have stumbled into the political crisis
in which we find ourselves now.

    Q. Is it true that on Oct. 9 you personally intervened to
prevent another Tiananmen Square happening in Leipzig by
countermanding a written order by Honecker to use military
units in and around the city -- which had received live
ammunition -- to put down the demonstrations by force, on the
grounds that they were counterrevolutionary?

    A. These demonstrations had been going on for several
weeks. The situation became more aggravated on Oct. 9. Members
of my and other parties refused to acknowledge that we were
confronted with a popular movement aimed at bringing about a
renewal in this country. I cannot confirm the existence of any
order to shoot or that a distribution of ammunition took place.
But clashes between demonstrators and the People's Police were
possible.

    I was telephoned that evening by one of my political
friends, then the second secretary of the district Helmut
Hackenberg, who was in charge of the action. He informed me that
several local personalities, including three secretaries of the
party, had joined Gewandhaus Orchestra director Kurt Masur in
a public appeal against the use of violence. Although I was not
empowered to do so by the office I held at the time, I told my
political friends that their appeal was correct, and I
encouraged them to act in such a way that everything would end
without the use of force.

    That same week, in preparation for the next Monday, Oct. 16
(when more demonstrations were expected), I went to Leipzig,
together with people who were responsible for security. We drew
up instructions that 1) any kind of violent confrontation must
be avoided, 2) in no case should firearms be used, and this was
summed up in an order by the chairman of the National Defense
Committee. I then went to the room in which we are now sitting
and presented the order to Honecker. I insisted on his signing
it, which he did.

    And there is one more thing, which I have not yet said in
public. I told my political friends in Leipzig, no matter what
the final order looks like, even if it should be a different
order, you will refuse to use firearms. Today I'm glad we acted
this way because it enabled us to protect the peaceful
revolution in our country.

    Q. You told them in effect that if there was any order to
shoot, they should ignore it?

    A. Yes. It was not an easy decision for me because I was
not General Secretary at the time. For me it was a question of
conscience and a deep personal conviction that in the civilized
world, conflicts can be resolved only by political means.

    Q. How can relations between the two German states and
their respective allies be improved?

    A. Today we have a unique opportunity to contribute to the
construction of the "European home." This seems to me a more
constructive approach than to give priority to the unity of
Germany. It is obvious that the citizens of the Federal
Republic have no interest in joining a socialist society, while
people in this country do not want to change their socialist
society into a capitalist one.

    Besides, the existence of two German states is a
stabilizing factor for European security. To be perfectly frank,
despite differences in views, I know of no serious politician,
either in the East or the West, who is interested in the
unification of the two states.

    If one speaks of confederation today, one must ask, On what
basis? It would be necessary to have a common foreign policy,
a common defense policy. I ask you, Do these conditions exist?
We are prepared to leave the Warsaw Pact, if the Federal
Republic is prepared to leave NATO. So long as both states
remain in their political and military alliances, a
confederation of the two states is simply not possible.

    Allow me to add that I think that in the future the Warsaw
Pact and NATO will have greater political importance than
military, and that it is in this context that a common "European
home" will be built.

    It has been generally accepted that the creation of the
G.D.R. marked a turning point in European history. Now you could
reverse the whole thing and say the disappearance of the G.D.R.
would also constitute another turning point. At the present
time, it would serve neither the interests of peace nor
stability, nor would it be in the interest of human beings.

    Q. Do you think that- at the end of this whole process,
there will be a neutral, nuclear-free zone in Central Europe as
already exists to the north in Finland and Sweden and to the
south in Austria and Switzerland?

    A. Quite simply, yes. I can imagine that the center of
Europe could become a nuclear weapons-free area. The G.D.R. has
declared that it would not be necessary to wait for the
completion of the common "European home" to accomplish this but
that it could start immediately.

    Q. How do you see developments in relations between the
G.D.R. and the U.S.?

    A. President Bush sent me a very significant and friendly
letter in connection with both my election as head of state and
the removal of travel restrictions. I consider this a signal for
closer relations with the U.S. There are some issues that still
need to be clarified.

    Q. What issues? Would you like most-favored-nation
treatment, for instance?

    A. Well, why not? Trade is always stabilizing.

    Q. As you know, Malta rhymes with Yalta. Do you think one
day we will look back at Malta as another historic turning
point?

    A. Times have changed. Today responsibility for the world
is borne by all countries, great and small. There are aspects
of the Yalta agreement that must remain intact. It is difficult
to look into the future, but I do think Malta is a meeting of
historic significance.